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THE TRANSFORMATION OF MARRIAGE AND
THE LAW*
Max Rheinstein**
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex."
These are the words of the so-called Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA) which was proposed by Congress in 19711 and which, by
September of 1973, had been ratified by 30 states. If the amendment is ratified by thirty-nine states, it will become effective within
two years. 2
The adoption of an "equal rights" amendment has been under
consideration for quite some time, a similar proposal having been
introduced as early as 1923,1 and there has been much discussion
and a good deal of speculation about the effects that such an amendment may have upon the law of the land. But in these long,
drawn out debates, scant attention has been paid to experiences of
other parts of the world. The movement of female emancipation,
however, is by no means uniquely American; it is worldwide, and it
has exerted its full force in all of the highly industrialized countries.
The postulate of legal equality of the sexes is part of the constitutional law of some countries, and in others it is just as powerful
without constitutional sanction. What have been the effects of such
applications of the principle of equality? Have they required the
massive changes in the civil law that some have predicted will be
* This article was adapted from an address presented by Professor Rheinstein at
the Northwestern University Law School on April 3, 1973.
** Professor Emeritus University of Chicago Law School.
1 H.RJ. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); SJ. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
2 Id. § 3; U.S. CONsT. art. V.
8 S.J. Res. 21, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 65 CoNG. REc. 150 (1923).
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necessary as a result of the ERA? The answers to such inquiries
may well help us to recognize the areas in which American law will
have to be changed if, with or without constitutional amendment, we
seriously undertake the actualization of the principle of sexual
equality.
Changes may have to be made in many areas of the law,4 but
the present article will deal with only one: that area which concerns
the relationship between husbands and wives. What changes may
be called for if we seriously try to remove the vestiges of the once
marked inequality? Or, more precisely, what conclusions can we
draw in this area from the experiences of foreign countries?
One must distinguish, first of all, between the property aspects
of the husband-wife relationship and its purely personal, non-monetary elements. As far as property interests are concerned, the experiences of foreign countries may be of considerable value in predicting our own needs, but in the matter of purely personal affairs,
the extensive foreign explorations and experiments will be of lesser
interest. European statutes, for example, deal elaborately with such
matters as the name or domicile of married women and with the allocation between husband and wife of the powers of decision in matters
of marital life, but little law is found on these matters in American
statutes or in published judicial opinions.
Thus, for example, and contrary to a widely held view, AngloAmerican law does not force a married woman to adopt the surname
of her husband. 5 Indeed, we have little law concerning the use of
names. By the common law, every person is free not only to assume any surname he pleases, but also to change it at any time.
When Mary Brown marries John Green, by social custom she will
probably style herself Mary Green or Mrs. John Green, but so far
as the law is concerned, nothing prevents her from continuing to call
herself Mary Brown or, if she prefers, Mary Brown Green or Mary
Rockefeller or Mary Brzybitche. If she tires of that name, she may
tomorrow call herself Mary Hinterstoesser.
4 See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment, A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE LJ. 871 (1971).
5 See Stuart v. Board of Supervisors, 266 Md. 240, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).

This

is not to say, however, that a state may not require a married woman to use her
husband's name for certain purposes.

See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp.

217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd per curiam, 405 U.S. 970 (1972) (driver's license
application); In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (vehicle registration);
People ex rel. Rage v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945).
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Most, if not all of the states have statutes that provide judicial
proceedings for the changing of one's name,' but unless such statutes have been held by a court of record to be compulsory, they
merely provide one with a convenient means of proving his identity
after the change. Decisions to the contrary appear to be exceedingly rare, and where no such decisions exist, no legal change is
called for. A few states have divorce laws which incorporate express rules concerning the name of a divorced woman,' but these
too have rarely been treated in published judicial opinions, and in
applying the ancient maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed, such statutes would appear
to be merely declaratory in nature, rather than mandatory. Nevertheless, if the postulate of sexual equality is to be adopted, it
would probably be advisable to repeal such statutes wherever they
exist.
Conceivably, the desire to make the equality of husband and
wife explicit may result in the formal enactment of a rule that upon
marriage, a woman's name will remain unchanged or that the husband may assume the surname of the wife or that both parties may
call themselves by their combined surnames. Such a rule would,
however, be superfluous. The present system of freedom in the
choice of a surname, together with the availability of formal proceedings to facilitate proof of identity, has served well, even under
our requirements of registration for Social Security and the federal
income tax. Perhaps at some future time we shall think seriously
about curing the defects in our present system of registering births,
deaths and marriages, and at that time it may also be advisable to
establish some clear rules concerning the names of married people.
But for the time being, no such need exists.
The situation is similar with respect to the question of domicile.
That concept upon which so much learning was once bestowed has
recently all but evaporated. It is, of course, often necessary to determine the connection that may exist between an individual and a
territory in order to ascertain where that individual is entitled to vote
in elections, which community is to furnish him with relief, where
he may sue or be sued, and what law will determine the intestate
6 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §§ 1275 et seq. (West 1954); ILL. RiLv. STAT.
ch. 96, §§ 1-3 (1971); WIs. STAT. § 296.36 (1969).
7 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961); Wis. STAT. § 247.20 (1969);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-21 (1966).
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succession to his property. At one time it was thought that, for all
of these purposes, the relevant tie between the individual and the
territorial unit ought to be determined in the same way, and the concept of domicile was developed for the purpose of making such a
unitary determination. This notion has since been discarded, but the
term "domicile" has not yet disappeared from the lawyer's parlance.
We now increasingly speak of residence rather than domicile, but
the continued use of the latter term still results in occasional misunderstandings.
The fallaciousness of such a lumping together of diverse considerations under a single term calls for a distinction in the use of
the term "residence" for such purposes as the franchise, welfare
legislation and the bringing of various types of civil actions. Most
courts, while they are not always explicit, do tend to make these distinctions, but remnants of the unified concept linger on and occasionally result in such inappropriate decisions as that rendered by
the Supreme Court of Arizona in Carlson v. Carlson.8 It was there
held that a married woman is still required to share the domicile of
her husband and that an exception to the recognized rule that a suit
for divorce must be brought in the domicile of the plaintiff applies
only in the case of a married woman who has left her husband
against his will. As a result, a wife cannot sue for divorce at her
separate residence when the separation has resulted from a mutual
agreement. Such a decision is incompatible with the principle of
equality and the result is clearly out of line with present trends.
As to powers of decision within the marital relationship, the
statutes are silent. At one time it was taken for granted that such
powers were the husband's and that the wife had to obey, but that
ancient rule has tacitly been relegated to the museum of legal antiquities. One still reads, it is true, that it is up to the husband to
determine where the family is to live, a concept supposedly flowing
from the notion that the wife of necessity shares her husband's domicile. This notion, in turn, may well have had its origin in the
idea, once taken to be self-evident, that a wife had to live with her
husband and to follow him wherever he decided to go. But domicile, as a legal concept, is not the same as "home," a concept out
of the realm of fact, and even where it is still held that the choice
of the home belongs to the husband, that proposition is qualified
8 75 Ariz. 308, 256 P.2d 249 (1953).
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by the proviso that the husband's decision must be a reasonable
one.9 Published decisions in this area seem not to have been rendered in modem times, except where a divorce is sought upon the
ground of desertion, and in Clark's comprehensive treatise on the
law of domestic relations, 10 the problem of powers of decision is
not discussed at all. It seems to be taken for granted that spouses
have to make their decisions jointly and that in a case of irreconcilable differences, the courts are not to intervene to impose their own
decisions on the parties. When neither spouse can prevail over
the other, the marriage fails and the only court in which the parties
will meet is the divorce court.
This American tendency of non-interference in the internal affairs of the marriage relationship is rarely expressed in so many
words but is nevertheless clearly recognized, if not in judicial practice, then at least in the failure of private parties to bring these
matters before the courts. It would be difficult, moreover, to find
an American court qualified to deal with internal marriage quarrels
other than, perhaps, the domestic relations courts whose domain has
in the past generally been restricted to interspousal assault and battery, and complaints of non-support.
In contrast, a good many European countries expressly provide
for the judicial arbitration of interspousal disputes. Such provisions
seem to indicate that the notion of the indissolubility of marriage
may still linger on in some areas, even in light of universally rising
rates of divorce. In times when there was no possibility of being
freed of the bond of marriage or when there existed widespread reluctance to resort to divorce, the availability of an authoritative arbiter of marital disputes may have been welcome, but today it would
have little, if any, real use. In American surroundings, it would be
particularly superfluous. Thus, with respect to the personal relationship between the spouses, foreign laws do not offer too many
helpful suggestions. The American attitude of non-interference
corresponds well with the postulate of sexual equality and with the
modem view of marriage as being a free union of two individuals
concerned with the preservation of their separate identities.
American law also appears to embody the principle of equality
in the manner in which it deals with the property aspects of the
9 See, e.g., M. PLOSCOWE, FOSTER & D. FREED, FAMILY LAw 831 (1972).
10 H.H. CLARK, THE LAW OF Domic RELATIONS IN THE UNrrED STATES (1968).
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husband-wife relationship. But when we look to foreign experiences we can see that there is still a need for refinement.
The country whose experiences are especially helpful in this
respect is the Federal Republic of Germany. When the private law
of the German Reich was unified, the system of marital property

that was applied to married couples who had not executed formal
property agreements was not one which was based upon the precepts of spousal equality. Title to the assets of the husband and the
wife remained separate, but control and management of the funds
of both spouses were, with some exceptions, united in the hands of
the husband. The husband was also entitled to the income from
the wife's property and, he was in turn responsible not only for her
support, but for the entire financial burden of the household. Only
that which the wife might earn through her own, independent activities was exempt from the husband's control and usufruct, and
from such independently earned income the wife had to contribute
to the expenses of the household. 1
After World War II, when the Federal Republic was constituted,
the command of sexual equality was incorporated in the German
constitution. The Basic Law of 23 May 1949 tersely proclaimed
that: "Men and women have equal rights," and that "nobody may
be discriminated against or be given an advantage because of his
sex.' 2 The drafters of the new constitution, recognizing that the
implementation of full sexual equality might present problems and
should not be carried out overnight, provided in Article 117 that
those laws which were not in accord with the equality provision
would nevertheless remain in effect until they would be explicitly
amended.
They added, however, that under no circumstances
should any law incompatible with the command of equality remain
in force beyond March 31, 1953. But when March of 1953 had
passed, no law changing the marital property provisions of the 1896
Code had been enacted. In the Bundestag, conservative legislators,
anxious to retain as much of the old law as politically practicable,
and progressive advocates of radical equality had been so evenly
balanced that no agreement on a new system of marital property
law had been obtained. Since the legislature was deadlocked, the
courts had to step into the breech.
11 BGB §§ 1363 et seq.
12 GRuNxsEsrTz art. 3, (2-3) (1949).
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The new supreme court, the Bundesgerichtshof, held that the
old system of marital property had ceased to be the statutory regime
and that the system of separation of assets had taken its place. 13 For
all practical purposes, the situation thus became identical to that
currently found in most states of this country, where the husband
owns his property and the wife owns hers. The obligations incurred
by the husband are his debts, those incurred by the wife are hers
and the expenses of the household are borne by both in proportion
to their financial ability. This simple, or at least seemingly simple,
system seems fully to correspond with the principle of equality. But
does it?
It was not long before there grew up in Germany the feeling
that made other European countries hesitate to adopt a separation
of assets system as their normal regime of marital property: the
feeling that formal equality is by no means the equivalent of "real"
equality between husband and wife. The separation of assets system
did not remedy one of the major faults of the former system. In
the type of marriage traditionally regarded as normal, the husband
was the breadwinner and the wife stayed at home and took care of
the household and the children. The husband's earnings were his
and whatever was saved belonged to him. The wife, on the other
hand, had neither earnings nor savings of her own, and when the
marriage was terminated, everything belonged to the husband while
nothing belonged to the wife.
For centuries, the law had provided a remedy for this difficulty. At the death of the husband the wife was entitled to a share
in his estate, and in Germany this share could not be taken away
from her either by her husband's last will or by his inter vivos gifts.
This system worked satisfactorily so long as death was the only, or
at least the overwhelmingly most frequent, cause of marriage termination. But another mode of marriage termination soon became
increasingly common: divorce. In the case of divorce, each spouse
went his separate way with all the property that he or she owned,
which usually meant that the husband took everything and the wife
nothing. All that the wife possessed was an alimony claim against
her husband, the enforceability of which was often doubtful, and if
the divorce was pronounced against the wife on the ground of her
marital misconduct, the claim for alimony was forfeited, either
13 See 1 H. DLLE, FAMIUIENmcraT 734 (1964-65).
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wholly or in part. 1 4 The value of the right to alimony was also
doubtful when the divorce was granted to the parties on the ground
of mutual fault or upon the no-fault ground of three years separation, even where an alimony settlement was reached in passionately
heated pre-trial bickering. All too often the husband's income,
while it had sufficed as the spread for one bed, was inadequate as
a cover for two. That situation, so well known to us here in the
United States, was aggravated in Germany where a new wife's right
to support had legal priority over that of the divorcee. 15
If the position of the divorced wife were to be improved, if she
were to be compensated for her toil in the home through which her
husband had been freed to accumulate earnings and to invest in
property, it seemed to be as just to give her a share of her husband's
property in the case of divorce as it was in the case of his death.
The answer seemed to lie in the system that constituted the legal
regime of marital property in neighboring France and in a great
many other countries as well: the regime of community property.
This system was already in use in Germany as an optional alternative to the regime of management by the husband of the spouses'
technically separate funds. 1 6 Under it, whatever one spouse earned
during the marriage was neither his nor hers but theirs, and when
the marriage ended, either by death or divorce, the community fund
was split between them. But this system presented a problem that
had long created difficulties in France. By whom was the community fund to be managed?
In times before the movement for female emancipation had
gained momentum, the answer was, of course, management by the
husband. 1 7 But that simple approach could no longer be maintained. In 1907, a statute was enacted in France which afforded a
married woman the power to manage and dispose of that portion of
the community fund consisting of her earnings through her own
business activities and employment outside of the household. 1 8 The
law turned out to be a dead letter, however, because third parties
had little chance of knowing whether the object of a particular transaction was part of the wife's reserved fund, part of the regular porMarriage Law of Feb. 20, 1946, § 58, BGB 2211.
15 Id. § 59.
16 CIV. CODE of 1896 §§ 1437 et seq., 1519 et seq., BGB 2213; C. CIrv. art. 1400
et seq.
-7 Id. art. 1421.
18 Law of July 13, 1907.
'4
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tion of the community or part of the wife's separate estate. If it
were either of the latter, she could not dispose of it without the consent of her husband. Thus, hardly anyone would contract with a
married woman and no bank would allow her to withdraw anything
19
from her account without the written consent of her husband.
That situation was sought to be remedied by later legislation, 2° but
even after such reforms were carried out, the husband was still the
manager of the main part of the community fund and of his wife's
separate property, other than her rdserve.
For the German reformers, the French model thus held little
attraction. While it gave the wife a fair share in the fund that had
been acquired during the marriage, the amount of control left in the
husband was still incompatible with the constitutional command of
full sexual equality. How, then, could these two seemingly irreconcilable ideas be combined?
A possible alternative was available in the system adopted in
Sweden in 1920 and in the other four Nordic countries shortly thereafter:2 1 the system of so-called deferred community. While the
marriage lasts, the spouse's funds are not only separately owned
but are also separately managed. When the marriage ends, either
by death or by divorce, the funds owned by each spouse are
thrown together and the combined fund is then split into equal
parts. While the principle looks simple, its implementation is not.
The separation of assets system as we have it in the United States
and as it initially emerged from the equal rights clause of the German Constitution can be seen to resemble two ships, independently
navigated by two captains. The traditional community property
system resembles one ship navigated by one captain. In deferred
community, however, we have two ships, each navigated by its own
captain, but the two ships are supposed to navigate together. How
can they avoid collisions or a veering off course?
In dealing with their separate property, each spouse must keep
in mind the fact that the other will someday share in it; thus, certain
transactions cannot be entered into by one spouse without the oth19 See M.

PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, 9 TRAnIT

PRATIQUE DE DRorr CIVIL FRANgAIs

842 (1927).
20 Law of Feb. 18, 1938; Law of Sept. 22, 1942.
21 Sweden: Law of June 12, 1920
Denmark: Law of Mar. 18, 1925
Finland: Law of June 13, 1929
Iceland: Law of June 20, 1923
Norway: Law of July 4, 1927
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er's consent. The law must also consider that a lazy wife may neglect her house and children. Shall she be allowed to walk away
with half of her husband's fortune? And what of the good-fornothing husband of a professionally successful wife? Shall a husband be able to give the bulk of his fortune to the children of his
first marriage or to his mistress so that there is nothing left for the
current wife or her children to share when the marriage ends? And
what about debts? Shall one spouse be able to burden the community fund with debts incurred for his or her own personal ends?
Safeguards are necessary to avoid such inequitable results in any
community system, whether it be of the traditional or of the Swedish
deferred type, and the result can be legislation of considerable complexity.
West Germany found it necessary to adopt such a deferred system, albeit with certain modifications. 2 Following firm Scandinavian traditions, the community fund in the Swedish system embraces all property of both spouses: property acquired during the
marriage, property owned by either spouse at the beginning of the
marriage, and "windfall" property, acquired during the marriage by
gift or inheritance. Even the Swedish system, however, exempts
some property from the community fund, such as assets legally
inalienable and assets specifically exempt from the community by
virtue of a premarital agreement. As a result, determining whether
a particular asset belongs to the deferred community fund can be
difficult. In Germany, where the universal community of assets ran
contrary to tradition, it became necessary to limit the divisible fund
to the assets acquired by either spouse through his or her gainful
activities during the marriage. On the other hand, the German
system was fashioned so as to be simpler than the Swedish in at
least one important respect. The equal sharing that applies in the
case of divorce does not normally apply in the case of death, where
the interests of a surviving spouse are sufficiently protected by a
generous fortifying of the survivor's statutory share in the decedent's
estate as protected against defeasance by the predeceasing spouse's
last will or inter vivos gifts.
In France, the pressure for reform of the legal regime 3 of marLaw of June 18, 1957.
Here, as in other places, the term "legal regime" refers to that system of
marital property that applies where the spouses have not entered into a contractual
property agreement.
22

23
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ital property was also irresistible, not only because of the demand
for sexual equality, but also because of a growing dislike for the
inclusion in the community fund of all moveable assets owned by
either spouse at the beginning of the marriage. Official discussions
were initiated at the end of World War II, but it took nearly twenty
years for reform to emerge-years that were filled with passionate
debates in various commissions, in the National Assembly and even
among the public at large. The main problem encountered was
how to combine a sharing of acquests with the independence of the
married woman.
Adoption of a system of deferred community patterned after the
German model was strongly advocated, but it was decided that such
a system would be so different from the ingrained French tradition
that it should not be imposed too abruptly upon the country. As
a result, the reform law2 4 allows each couple to choose, by formal
agreement, a system of deferred community, the details of which
are spelled out in the statutory text. 5 In the absence of such an
agreement (and thus in the great majority of cases), the law imposes
a new "legal" regime that is essentially a modified version of the
old French system.2 6 Its main difference from the old system is
that the community fund, which formerly consisted not only of the
marital acquests but also of the pre-maritally owned moveables, is
now limited to those acquests which are made during marriage
through the gainful activities of either spouse. The wife's power to
manage and dispose of assets acquired through her outside activities
has thus been clarified, but the distinctive feature of the new French
system is that the power of managing and disposing of the bulk
of the community fund, while it still remains with the husband,
is now subject to the requirement that the wife must consent to
most acts of alienation and encumbrance. This has resulted in a
curious situation. By a series of reforms, French law has abolished
the husband's headship of the household.2 7 He may no longer unilaterally determine the mode and standard of the family's life, the
place where the family is to live or even the education of his children. In all such respects the husband and wife must cooperate
and if they cannot, separation or divorce is the only way out. But in
the management of the community, the husband remains the pre24 Law of July 13, 1965.
25 C. Cry. art. 1569-80 (amended).
26
27

Id. 1400-91.
Law of Sept. 22, 1942; Law of Oct. 19, 1945; Law of June 4, 1970.
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dominant partner. The system is complicated and the future will
have to show how well or how poorly it will work.
I have dwelt upon these foreign experiences because they may
suggest some of the changes needed in our own system if the Equal
Rights Amendment becomes effective or, even without constitutional
command, by virtue of the exigencies of the times. The problem
of modifying present American laws of marital property if they are
fully to respond to the demand of equality differs, however, with
respect to those states whose present systems require a separation of
assets and with respect to the nine jurisdictions whose present regime is that of a community of acquests. 28 In the separation of assets states, the death situation is fairly well, though not completely,
under control. The surviving spouse is usually given a generous
share in the estate of the decedent and is generally protected against
defeasance by the predeceasing partner's last will. 29 But protection
against defeasance by inter vivos gift is either nonexistent or only rudimentary at best. 0
Much more precarious is the situation created by divorce. The
usual practice is that each party walks away from a marriage with
the property that he or she owns, but in a great many cases the wife
actually "owns" little or nothing. This situation is sought to be corrected by giving her a claim for alimony, but that claim may be, and
often is, unenforceable. In some states, the court may order a property settlement giving the wife a portion of the husband's estate. If
that is not permissible under the law, the court may still grant her
such a share under the guise of alimony by ordering its payment in
a lump sum or by ordering a conveyance of property in lieu of alimony. In the overwhelming majority of cases, this problem is
avoided by arranging property settlements, alimony and child support in pre-trial negotiations-negotiations in which the spouse seeking the divorce tends to pay dearly for his freedom. But when the
award is made by the court, distribution depends upon the unpredictable discretion of the judge, and where a settlement is sought
through bickering, the outcome often depends largely upon such
factors as the comparative skill of the attorneys, the urgency with
which the divorce is sought to be obtained and the decency or greed
of the parties.
28 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Puerto Rico,
Texas and Washington.
29 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 16 (1971).
30 See

474

W.D.

MAcDoNALD, FnAuD ON THE WIow's SnARE

(1960).
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In England, which is also a separation of assets jurisdiction, the
need for reform is being felt much more acutely than in this country,
where there reigns a curious state of acquiescence (an acquiescence
which may, however, be shaken by ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment). Part of the problem is due to English dissatisfaction
with the present system of distributing marital assets upon the death
of a spouse. In contrast to the law of the United States, English law
provides neither dower nor an indefeasible share for the surviving
spouse. The widow's only remedy is to induce the court to order
her husband's estate to pay her income3 1 or to give her a part of the
property itself,32 but this remedy is entirely within the discretion of
the court. In the case of a divorce, English law provides the wife
with some protection against ejectment from the marital home,"3
and each spouse is entitled to keep the property that he or she equitably owns. But who owns, let us say, the furniture, the savings account or the house? As long as a marriage functions, spouses of
modest means rarely earmark their assets as "his" and "hers." The
pay envelopes go into a joint account, savings are jointly invested
and the house is often jointly owned. Disputes as to who owns
what are not uncommon, but if they go into court at all, in the United
States they tend to arise less in the case of divorce than they do in the
case of death where the litigants are the surviving spouse and the administrator of the decedent's estate.
But, a great deal of litigation has occupied the English divorce
courts,3 4 and the House of Lords has established the basic principle that for each asset the court must ascertain the intention
with which it was acquired. 35 Was it "really" meant to belong to
the husband? Was it meant to belong to the wife, or was it meant
to belong to both? If intended to belong to both, then in what proportions? The trouble is that the parties usually have no such
specifically defined intention, or if they do, their intentions cannot
be subsequently ascertained. So, just as in the United States, the
outcome ultimately depends upon the unpredictable discretion of
the judge. Small wonder that the Law Commission, recently charged
with the task of proposing a new system of marital property, is
81 Inheritance (Family Provision) Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 45; Intestates'
Estates Act of 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 64.
32 Family Provision Act of 1966, c.35.
33 Matrimonial Homes Act of 1967, c.75.
34 See A. Kiralfy, The English Law, in CoMPARATI
LAw OF MATIMONuL
PROPERTY 180, 192 (A. Kiralfy ed. 1972).

35 Pettitt v. Pettitt, [1970] A.C. 777; Gissing v. Gissing, [1970] 3 W.L.R. 255.
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seriously thinking of adopting a community property regime.36
The problems inherent in such a system, so amply illustrated
by the European experiences, also exist in the nine community
property jurisdictions of the United States. The crux of these problems, as we have seen, is how to combine equality of the parties with
efficiency in the management of the community fund. California
has adopted a system similar to the French idea of reserving to the
wife the management and disposition of that part of the community
fund which she earned through her own activities outside the household.17 Texas has recently adopted a system that, for all practical
effects, is one of deferred community of acquests and which goes
so far as not to impose any restrictions whatsoever upon either spouse
in dealing with his or her own portion of the common fund. 8s Such
a scheme, however, endangers one of the principal advantages of
community property, viz., the secured participation of the housewife
in the acquests of the husband-breadwinner.
Another aspect of American community property law that will
create problems under the ERA is the question of property settlements in the case of divorce. Is a fifty-fifty split proper under all
circumstances including the case of a short-lived marriage of, let us
say, a highly paid movie star to a lazy bum? If not, and if the property settlement is to continue to depend upon judicial discretion or
upon a judicial finding of "guilt," a woman will be unable to know
in advance in what financial position she will find herself if she puts
an end to the unfortunate marriage.
Thus, it may seem that the task of designing a system of marital property law that corresponds to the notion of marriage as the
total community of life as well as to the tenets of women's liberation
is as insoluble as the problem of squaring the circle. But if we
give the matter further thought, a solution may yet appear to be
possible. Perhaps we need an approach different from that pursued
by those reformers who have regarded the scheme of community
property as the only one compatible with the principle of equality of
the spouses.
When the principle of equality became dominant in the Federal Republic of Germany, and even when it was elevated to a rule
of constitutional law, it was taken for granted that it necessarily re36 LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY LAW, Working Paper

No. 42, at 3 (1971).
37 CAL. Civ. CODE § 162 (West 1954).
38 TEX. FAMILY CODE § 5.22 (1969).

476

HeinOnline -- 68 Nw. U. L. Rev. 476 1973-1974

68:463 (1973)

Transformation of Marriage

quired a system in which the wife shared in the acquests of the husband. But recently, doubts have arisen concerning the validity of
that premise. The type of marriage that the European reformers
have had in mind is what is called in German the Hausfrauenehe,
that is, a marriage in which the husband and wife have different
roles. The husband is the breadwinner and the wife the stay-athome who takes care of the household and the children. But that
traditional scheme is no longer the only, nor even the prevailing one.
More and more married women are entering the labor market and
are working outside the home to increase the family income with an
income independently earned. Any scheme of community property, regular or deferred, is bound to be complex. Is such a scheme,
therefore, necessary or even appropriate to this new type of Doppelverdienerehe? Is not this type of marriage better served by a system
of separation of assets? Or would the equality command of the
ERA require that system's replacement by a system of community
property?
We must also consider that the Doppelverdienerehe is still not
the universal type of marriage. A substantial number of households
are still conducted in the manner of the Hausfrauenehe, even in the
Soviet Union where a good deal of pressure is put upon women to
drive them into the labor force. A number of recent proposals
3 9 by raiswould turn the Hausfrauenehe into a Doppelverdienerehe
ing the status of "housewife" to the level of a trade or profession,
thus providing the married woman with an "income" that she could
spend or save just as she could an income earned outside the home.
Out of this income she would have to contribute to pension and social security funds so that she would have the same economic independence as a "working woman." Her wages would, of course,
have to be paid by the husband and she, in turn, would have to
contribute her appropriate share to the expenses of the household.
In a way, such a scheme already exists in that vast number of American households where the husband hands the pay envelope to the
wife, lets her pay out of it the expenses of the household and then
deposits such savings as there may be in a joint bank account, or
invests them in a home or in securities held jointly by the spouses
with the incident of survivorship. But again we must remember
that this type of marriage is by no means the only one.
39 Stcker, 1972 Zur Kritik des Familienvermdgensrechts,NEtuE JrUISTiCHE WOCHENscHR 553; Kay, Making Marriage and Divorce Safe for Women, 60 CAIn'. L
REV. 1683 (1972).
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We live in a pluralistic society in which married couples can
and do arrange the style of their marital lives in many different ways.
We may well come to the ultimate conclusion that, with or without
the ERA, it is in our best interests to retain our present system and
to leave married couples free to work out their own schemes of holding property, using income and bearing the household burdens. By
force of economic, social and ideological developments, women
hopefully will continue to increase those traits of personality that
enable them to deal with their husbands as equal partners.
In matters of marital property, freedom of contract thus appears to be the system most appropriate to a free society. But if the
ERA takes effect, or if we simply wish to implement fully the principle of sexual equality, some changes in the present law may still
be called for. 40 In the case of death, for example, one spouse can,
by inter vivos gift, still defeat the indefeasible share to which the surviving spouse is entitled, and a housewife thus cannot be sure of
sharing in her husband's marital acquests. Her share can be secured by making the gifts of one spouse made within a certain period
prior to death subject to annulment by the other. The harsh effects
that such a rule might have upon an innocent recipient can be avoided
by giving a defense of change of position to a bona fide donee.
In the case of divorce the housewife can be protected only by
a change in the rule, which still obtains in a good many states, that
each party gets only that property which he or she owns at the time
of the divorce. But what new rule should take its place? One possibility would be simply to divide the spouses' combined funds, or
at least their combined marital acquests, in half; but in the case of
marital acquests, there would still be certain difficulties of proof.
Which assets are acquests and which were owned before the marriage? Few couples are likely at the time of their marriage to draw
up inventories. Community property states resort to the presumption that all assets are deemed to be acquests until the contrary is
shown, but as we have seen, unfairness can still result. So it seems
that in each case judicial discretion ought to determine how the
combined assets of the spouses should be partitioned. That solution, however, holds not only the risk of arbitrariness but also the
drawback of unpredictability. Another possibly workable solution
40 Such changes would necessarily mean that the financial costs of marital life
would no longer be borne by the husband alone, but by both spouses, in proportion

to the respective incomes of each. Also, the husband would no longer preponderate
in the direction of the family's affairs.
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might provide for a splitting into equal parts as the general rule,
subject to judicial power to order a different distribution upon convincing proof of special circumstances.41 If such changes are made,
our present system of separation of assets will become fully compatible with the postulate of sexual equality.
What, we may finally ask, will become of the institution of
marriage? Is "to love, honor and obey until death do us part" to
be changed into "to relate, respect, yet be your own person, until
perchance, affections erode?" 42 I wonder whether we have indeed
reached a turning point that is any more decisive than were those
crises of the past, all of which were successfully survived by the
institutions of marriage and the family.

41 Law of June 18, 1957, admits of an exception to the general rule of equal
splitting in a case of "gross unfairness," especially where a spouse has for some
period of time inexcusably failed to perform the duties of the marital relationship.
42 TAm NEw YoaR.R, Mar. 31, 1973, at 80.
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